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ABSTRACT 
Game theory presents a set of decision-makers in a model in order to simulate how 
they will interact according to a set of rules.  The game is set up with a set of players, 
actions, and preferences.  The model allows each player to, in some way, be affected 
by the actions of all players.  Nash equilibrium illustrates that the best action for any 
given player depends on the other players’ actions, and so, each player must make 
some assumption about what the competition will do.  The goal of this project is to 
model situations of different car companies to improve our understanding of how 
they will allocate their resources.  In our case, the players will be two car 
manufacturers.  The actions of the players will be how each company invests its 
resources with some particular vehicle, make or model, and the preferences will be 
what each company wants to spend the most resources on.  The payoff functions 
will be generated for each player that will also represent the preferences under 
given assumptions of each player’s activities. By finding the Nash equilibrium of the 
“game”, a stable activity table will be concluded and compared with the 
manufacturers’ choices and gains in reality. 
   
 
 
 
Thesis Mentor:  
Dr. Hua Wang 
 
 
      Honors Director: 
Dr. Steven Engel 
  
 2 
Acknowledgments 
First, I would like to thank Dr. Hua Wang from the Department of 
Mathematical Sciences at Georgia Southern University for his time and effort in 
helping me complete this project.  Without his mentoring, my undergraduate thesis 
would not have been possible.  
I want to give my sincerest thanks to Dr. Martha Abell, who has been my 
advisor, as well as my professor.  She has always been more than supportive of both 
my academic and athletic endeavors.  With that said, there are numerous other 
professors from the Department of Mathematical Science at Georgia Southern 
University who have contributed to my education and deserve recognition. 
I would also like to thank the University Honors Program for the opportunity 
to be a part of this reputable organization and for the continued support over my 
four years at Georgia Southern University.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
1. Introduction 
In the study of economics, one aims to invest their money, time, and 
resources in general to produce a profit.  However, there are many factors that affect 
an investment: for example, competition within the market, demand of the 
consumer, and cost of production, which includes labor and materials.  With all 
factors considered, sometimes strategies for producing a profit are not at all 
obvious.  Instead, one must reallocate their resources wisely in order to break even, 
minimize their losses, or maximize the profit.  As an example, car manufacturers 
choose certain models from their showroom for which they will invest the majority 
of their resources based on the demands of society, costs, potential competitors, etc.     
In finance, the cost-volume formula is applied to determine production cost 
given a certain number of units.  Production costs include any fixed or variable 
expenses incurred when a 
business provides goods or 
services.  Fixed costs do not 
increase or decrease regardless 
of the output.  They are constant 
and independent of business 
activity, for example, the lease 
payment owed on a building.  
Variable costs, on the 
other hand, fluctuate 
Figure 1: Cost-Volume Formula 
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depending on how many goods are produced or how much service is provided.  
Materials and labor are examples of variable costs.  Together, fixed costs and 
variable costs make up total production cost.  See Figure 1 for an illustration of the 
cost-volume formula. 
  Game theory, introduced in 1944 by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern (Ross, 2012), models a situation where two or more decision makers 
interact.  Each strategic game consists of a set of players, a set of actions, and player 
preferences in regards to their actions.  Player is a generic term that can be used to 
represent firms, political candidates, or prisoners like in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
example explained in the following section.  Actions represent the players’ decisions 
or allocation of resources.  The preferences, in our setting, are the pay-off function 
or the profit a player can expect.  
 
2. Introduction to Game Theory 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is one of the simplest examples of a two-player game 
(see, for instance, Osborne, 2000).  For this game, there are two suspects being held 
in separate cells.  There is enough evidence against each suspect to convict them of a 
minor offense, but the only way to convict either one of a major crime is if the other 
suspect acts as an informer and ‘finks’ to the authorities.  Under this situation, both 
prisoners serve a minor sentence if neither finks; but finking results in a reduction 
penalty; staying quiet, however, has the risk of receiving the maximum penalty if the 
other prisoner finks.  The table below illustrates the game between the two players:  
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Table 1. The Prisoner's Dilemma 
  Suspect 2 
   
Quiet 
 
Fink 
 
Suspect 1 
Quiet 2,2 0,3 
Fink 3,0 1,1 
 
In Table 1, one player chooses from the row actions (Q/F) and the other from 
the columns.  The numerical values correspond to the preferences of each player 
under each scenario with higher values representing a higher pay-off, which in our 
case is less prison time.  For example, from the entry [3,0], suspect 1 finks and 
suspect 2 remains quiet, which would result in a higher pay-off for suspect 1 and 
maximum prison time for suspect 2, consequently, the minimum pay-off.  
 
3.  Nash Equilibrium 
Nash equilibrium is a concept of game theory where the optimal outcome for 
the model is one where no player has an incentive to change their decision after 
considering the decision of their opponent.  Thus, the player would gain no 
advantage from having deviated from their original action assuming their 
opponent’s strategy was held constant.  Any particular game could have several 
Nash equilibria or none at all.  This concept was named after its creator, Nobel Prize 
winner John Forbes Nash, Jr., who published an article in 1950 introducing this 
notion of equilibrium for n-person games.  The concept has been applied in both 
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economics and behavioral sciences and has since become the centerpiece of modern 
game theory (Holt, 2004, 3999-4002).  
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma example in Table 2, Nash equilibrium can be 
accomplished when both players ‘fink’ represented by the last cell, (1,1).  For 
example, referring to the bottom row of Table 1, say player 1 chooses to ‘fink’; 
player 2 is better off also choosing ‘fink’ to yield the highest possible payoff given 
the first player’s action.  Given that player 2 chooses ‘fink’, we see from the table, 
player 1 would also choose to ‘fink’ between a payoff of zero for remaining quiet and 
a payoff of one for finking.  Analyzing the first cell, (2,2) meaning ‘quiet’, ‘quiet’, both 
players will want to deviate from their action to receive a higher payoff knowing 
that their opponent chose ‘quiet’.  Consequently, the only Nash equilibrium of the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is when both players ‘fink’ because the incentive to go free 
eliminates the mutually desirable outcome (2,2) where both players remain ‘quiet’ 
(see, for instance, Osborne, 2000). 
 
4. Competing Car Manufacturers 
In this note, we seek to propose a model that illustrates the competition 
between two car manufacturers, Toyota and Ford, and how they allocate their 
resources according to their preferences and the restrictions of the market.  
Table 2 below shows the data collected. This includes the unit prices and 
sales statistics for the two manufacturers for each of the three models under 
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consideration.  The unit price recorded represents the most generic version of each 
model.  Also, the sales statistics were divided into three four-month periods for the 
year for simpler calculations.   
 
Table 2. 
   Amount Sold Yearly in the US 
Make Model Starting Price  2012  
   Jan-Apr May-Aug Sept-Dec 
Toyota Corolla $16,800.00 90176 106445 91270 
Ford Focus $16,605.00 85468 81482 78972 
      
Toyota Camry $22,235.00 142224 138311 124350 
Ford Fusion $21,900.00 85559 96306 59398 
      
Toyota Sienna $26,585.00 33648 44634 36440 
Ford Explorer $29,600.00 47731 56023 60433 
 
First we consider the simple model where we let Xp be the percent of the 
price that indicates profit.  We will let Xp be fixed and equal 2/3.  We then find the 
amount of profit each manufacturer would earn from selling one model.  For 
example, the starting price for a Toyota Corolla is $16,800.00, and two-thirds of this 
is $11,200.  
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Table 3. 
   
 
 
Ford 
 
  Focus Fusion Explorer 
 Corolla 11200, 11070 11200, 14600 11200, 19733.33 
Toyota Camry 14823.33, 11070 14823.33, 14600 14823.33, 19733.33 
 Sienna 17723.33, 11070 17723.33, 14600 17723.33, 19733.33 
 
From Table 3, when only considering the price and profit ratio, it would 
indicate that both companies should invest their resources in selling SUVs.  The last 
entry indicates that Nash equilibrium can be achieved, but using what we know 
about the market, this would not make sense.  This is actually an invalid conclusion 
because there is not infinite demand for SUVs due to gas prices and whether or not 
the vehicle is for a family or an individual.  Also, if both companies channeled all 
resources into manufacturing and selling SUVs there would be greater competition 
to appeal to the fixed number of consumers looking to buy an SUV, meaning both 
companies would miss out on another population entirely that is interested in a 
coupe or a sedan.  
Building on the previous table, we analyze price with number of models sold 
to determine the price to profit ratio for Table 4.  For example, for a Toyota Corolla, 
we multiply starting price by the number of Corollas sold between January and April 
of 2012.  From the data collected in Table 2, the starting price is $16,800, and the 
amount sold is 90,176, which yields 1,514,956,800.  This introduces the demand for 
a particular model into the table.    
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Table 4. 
   
 
 
Ford 
 
  Focus Fusion Explorer 
 Corolla 1514956800, 
1419196140 
1514956800, 
1873742100 
1514956800, 
1412837600 
Toyota Camry 3162350640, 
1419196140 
3162350640, 
1873742100 
3162350640, 
1412837600 
 Sienna 894532080, 
1419196140 
894532080, 
1873742100 
894532080, 
1412837600 
 
Table 4 indicates that the consideration of demand for any one model forces 
the Nash equilibrium to the center, the entry “Camry, Fusion”, (3162350640, 
1873742100).  This makes more sense in reality than the afore mentioned Nash 
equilibrium because selling one SUV compared to one sedan would always be more 
profitable due to the higher price.  However, from what we know about the market, 
more consumers are buying these sedans, and in the long run, the larger number of 
sales overcomes the greater unit price.  All things considered, if both companies 
invest all their resources into a mid-sized sedan, they will be competing for one 
population of consumers, again one company will control the market and the other 
will be missing out on the population in demand of a larger vehicle or the market 
will be divided and neither company will return a significant profit.  
For more practical purposes, Table 5 introduces the demand of the entire 
market as opposed to the demand for just a particular vehicle.  Thus, we are 
calculating the price to profit ratio similar to Table 4, but are considering the 
consumers who purchased both the comparable Ford vehicle and Toyota vehicle.  
Recall that, we multiplied the starting price by the amount sold for Corollas between 
January and April of 2012, which yielded 1,514,956,800.  Now, we divide 
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1,514,956,800 by the sum of 90,176 and 85,468, which represents the number of 
consumers who purchased both Toyota Corollas and Ford Focuses, because the 
Focus is the most comparable model to the Corolla in the Ford showroom. 
 
Table 5. 
   
 
 
Ford 
 
  Focus Fusion Explorer 
 Corolla 8625.155, 
8079.958 
8625.155, 
8225.996 
8625.155, 
17361.206 
Toyota Camry 13883.172, 
8079.958 
13883.172, 
8225.996 
13883.172, 
17361.206 
 Sienna 10992.173, 
8079.958 
10992.173, 
8225.996 
10992.173, 
17361.206 
 
In this most complex model thus far, the Nash equilibrium is the cell for 
Camry, Explorer, (13883.172, 17361.206).  This indicates that Toyota profits more 
from the section of the market represented by the mid-sized sedan and that Ford 
controls the sports-utility sector, suggesting that Toyota invests the majority of its 
resources in production of the Camry and Ford invests the majority of its resources 
in production of the Explorer.  We find this to be true for today’s market.  Once 
again, this is more realistic then the Nash equilibrium from Table 4 that suggested 
both companies invested in their competitive mid-sized sedans.  Our new, modified 
Nash equilibrium for Table 5 allows both companies to profit from different sectors 
of the market.  
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5. Mixed Strategy 
 As one can see, when we progressively consider the factors from reality, 
different Nash equilibriums appear in different models, resulting in different 
preferences between the two manufacturers.  However, maximizing the profit, as 
one can imagine, relies on not investing all resources in the same model.  And here is 
where the more advanced game theoretical study, in terms of mixed strategies, 
comes into play. 
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where each player chooses his or her 
actions probabilistically is referred to as stochastic.  This particular action profile 
requires a steady state in which every player’s behavior is constant or the behavior 
pattern remains constant each time the game is played, and no player wishes to 
deviate knowing another player’s action.  The following is an example of a stochastic 
steady state (Osborne, 98). 
 
Table 6. Matching Pennies 
   
Player 2 
   
Head 
 
Tail 
 
Player 1 
Head $1, -$1 -$1, $1 
Tail -$1, $1 $1, -$1 
 
 
This game is setup with two players who will simultaneously show either the 
head side or the tail side of a penny.  When both players show the same side, player 
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2 must pay player 1 a dollar; player 1 will pay player 2 a dollar if the sides are 
different.  The payoff for this game will be the amount of money involved.  And in 
regards to player preferences, player 1 wants to make the same action as player 2, 
and player 2 hopes to have the opposite action of player 1.  Thus, player 1 and 
player 2’s preferences will always conflict.   
 Let’s assume player 2 chooses Head with probability q, then he or she 
chooses Tail by 1-q.  Say player 1 chooses Head with probability p; player 1 will earn 
$1 with probability pq + (1 – p)(1 – q) denoting that the outcome is either (Head, 
Head) or (Tail, Tail).  Player 2 earns $1 by (1 – p)q + p(1 – q), an outcome of either 
(Head, Tail) or (Tail, Head).  After distributing and combining like terms the first 
probability becomes 1 – q + p(2q – 1); the second simplifies to q + p(1 – 2q).  If we 
let the value of q be less than ½, then player 2 chooses Head less than half of the 
times the game is played.  From the two equations, we see that the first payoff 
function is decreasing in the variable p and the second is increasing in p.  Then, the 
value of p that gives player 1 the best opportunity to win is zero.  In conclusion, if 
player 2 chooses Head with a probability less than ½, then player 1 should choose 
Tail with certainty and similarly, if player 2 chooses Head by more than ½, player 1 
should choose Head on every play (Osborne, 98-99).   
 This particular game has no Nash equilibrium, but in a stochastic steady 
state, each player chooses his or her action with probability ½.  To see this, suppose 
that our first player chooses each of his actions with probability ½.  If our second 
player chooses Head with probability p, he chooses Tail with probability 1-p.  This 
means the outcomes (Head, Head) and (Head, Tail) each occur by probability ½p, 
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and the outcomes (Tail, Tail) and (Tail, Head) happen with probability ½(1 – p).  
Applying basic algebra we determine player 2 wins $1 with the probability ½p + 
½(1 – p), which simplifies to ½.  Thus, player 2 also loses $1 with probability ½, and 
can do no better than choose either Head or Tail with probability ½, indicating 
every value of p is optimal.  Switching the roles of player 1 and player 2, player 1 
would also choose Head or Tail with probability ½, so we have a stochastic steady 
state for Matching Pennies when the players choose their actions by ½ (Osborne, 
98).   
            
6. Dynamic Model 
A cube root function can depict the relationship between the quantity of 
vehicles sold and the profit returned for a particular make and model.  The curve of 
a cube root approaches a horizontal asymptote from either direction and changes 
concavity.  Our relationship can be illustrated by the following function:  
    	 
   
   
   
where s denotes the quantity sold and p denotes profit. 
 We must include the technical coefficient two for the cube root so that there 
is always a solution to the equation.  This function best fits the data set because the 
more vehicles produced will return a greater profit up until a given point, where the 
profit increases at a decreasing rate, eventually leveling off.  We will let our 
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breakeven point, the point on the curve where there is a change in concavity, be 
determined by the historical data.   
Referring back to Table 2, we see that between January and April 2012, 
Toyota sold 90,176 Corollas.  Utilizing our fixed proportion Xp, we multiply the price 
by 2/3 to obtain $11,200, which recall is the profit from selling one Corolla, and then 
multiplying that by our total quantity sold, 90,176, gives us $100.9 million.  Our 
breakeven point for the graph modeling the relationship between number of 
vehicles sold and profit for a Toyota Corolla has the ordered pair, (90176 , 100.9).  
We use the same procedure to obtain the breakeven point for Ford Focus, which we 
find to be (85468, 946.1).  The graphs for both models are displayed below. 
 
           
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profit (p) (in millions) 
Quantity sold (s) 0 
 Breakeven 
point 
  90176 
100.9 
Figure 2: Profit versus Quantity Sold for Toyota Corollas
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 Notice the curves for the two vehicles are not identical.  However, any change 
in either function directly affects its competitor.  The slope and altitude of the curve 
is constantly changing and consequently, the breakeven point also moves along the 
curve. 
 This relationship, when considered in a dynamic setting, introduces more 
mathematical components into the game theoretical model.  If we let our function be 
modeled by the derivative: 
′     
Where F denotes the sales for Ford Focus and C denotes the sales for Toyota Corolla. 
Then the curve is the integral of that function: 
 
Profit (p) (in millions) 
Quantity sold (s) 0 
Breakeven 
point 
85468 
946.1 
Figure 3: Profit versus Quantity Sold for Ford Focuses
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From here, it is obvious that any increase or decrease in the sales of Corollas will 
change the dynamic of the graph for Ford Focus and vice versa.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 In our game theory model, our players are the two car manufacturers Ford 
and Toyota.  Their actions are defined by how they invested their resources in a 
certain make or model.  By finding the Nash equilibrium of the three “games” we 
proposed, a stable activity table was concluded and compared with the 
manufacturers’ choices and gains in reality.  We further established the groundwork 
of the dynamic modeling system that considers the constant changes of each 
player’s choices and preferences.  
 The models and methodologies presented here are not limited to the study of 
manufacturers or companies in general.  Any financial scenario between multiple 
competitors can be examined through our approach.   
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